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1 See for example Kaelble, “1848.”
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Economic Crises and the European
Revolutions of 1848
HELGE BERGER AND MARK SPOERER 
Recent historical research tends to view the 1848 revolutions in Europe as caused by
a surge of radical ideas and by long-term socioeconomic problems. However, many
contemporary observers interpreted much of the upheaval as a consequence of short-
term economic causes, specifically the serious shortfall in food supply that had
shaken large parts of the Continent in 1845–1847, and the subsequent industrial
slump. Applying standard quantitative methods to a data set of 27 European coun-
tries, we show that it was mainly immediate economic misery, and the fear thereof,
that triggered the European revolutions of 1848.
In the 1990s the acceleration of economic and political integration in West-ern Europe and the democratization of Eastern Europe led to an increasing
interest in the turbulent year 1848, when large parts of the Continent
experienced a striving for political participation and self-determination.1
The recent sesquicentennial has given rise to a wealth of literature, espe-
cially in countries where 1848 meant a first step towards more demo-
cratic political institutions, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, and
Romania. Many of these studies reflect the scholarly trend away from
social history. To be sure, even after the “cultural turn” most historians
concede that structural socioeconomic problems contributed to rising
popular discontent. But whereas in the 1970s and 1980s long- and short-
term socioeconomic determinants were pivotal in explanations of the
1848 revolutions, short-term economic factors now tend to be margin-
alized; instead, greater weight is placed on the spread of liberal and dem-
ocratic ideas, and on the inflexible and increasingly outdated political
institutions of the time, which were ill-suited to cope with the societal
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2 Issues at stake were the material deprivation of large parts of the rural population (pauperism) and
state intervention in individual affairs, for instance, through military conscription and discretionary
taxation. For an overview see Sperber, European Revolutions, pp. 47–49.
3 We have systematically checked monographs and paper collections covering the 1848 revolutions
in English, German, and Latin languages published since the mid-1990s for discussions of short-term
socioeconomic developments such as the increase of food prices in 1845–1847 or the economic down-
turn of 1846–1848. Höbelt (1848) and Bruckmüller and Häusler (1848), who analyze the revolution
in Austria, do not discuss economic factors at all. Neither do Schroeder (Transformation) nor Broers
(Europe), nor the contributions on Hungary in Fischer (Ungarische Revolution). In the account of
Judson (Wien) of the revolution in Austria socioeconomic factors are rarely mentioned. For Switzer-
land, the contributions in Hildbrand and Tanner (Zeichen) do not refer to economic factors. Some of
the work on Switzerland collected in Ernst, Tanner, and Weishaupt (Revolution) does mention eco-
nomic factors, but these are not found to be causal. Even in the abundant German anniversary literature
the economic crisis is almost totally neglected. See Dipper and Speck, 1848; Dowe, Haupt, and Lange-
wiesche, Europa 1848; Gall, 1848; Hardtwig, Revolution; Jansen and Mergel, Revolution; Lill, Revolu-
tion; Mommsen, 1848; Rill, 1848; Timmermann, 1848; and Langewiesche, Revolutionen. Notable
exceptions are Sperber, European Revolutions; Hahn, “Sozioökonomische Ordnung”; Hein, Revolu-
tion; Lévêque, Ébranlement; and Stürmer, Crise. In contrast, earlier accounts of the 1848 revolutions
analyzed long and short-term socioeconomic factors in great detail: see for example Stearns, Revolu-
tions, pp. 11–35; C. Tilly et al., Rebellious Century; Siemann, Deutsche Revolution; Pinkney, Decisive
Years; Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 681f.; and Price, Revolutions, pp. 7, 24–26.
4 Sigmann, 1848, pp. 183–85.
5 Kuczynski, “Wirtschaftliche und soziale Voraussetzungen.”
6 Engel, “Getreidepreise,” p. 251 (our translation).
7 Rostow, British Economy; Hobsbawm, “Economic Fluctuations”; Rudé, “Why Was There No
Revolution?”; C. Tilly et al., Rebellious Century; and R. Tilly, Vom Zollverein. See also Stearns,
problems of early industrialization.2 Surprisingly few authors stress the
deep economic crisis that immediately preceded the revolutionary events:
witness the plethora of monographs that mention short-run economic factors
not at all or only in passing, and the many edited volumes that lack a single
paper on the economic crisis preceding the events of 1848.3
But while ideas and institutions undoubtedly contribute to our understand-
ing of the general preconditions for the upheaval of 1848, they fail to explain
the timing, simultaneity, or regional distribution of the events. Here a more
economic perspective might be helpful. Many contemporary observers inter-
preted much of what was going on as a direct consequence of the serious
shortfall in basic food supplies that had shaken the Continent in 1845–1847
and triggered famine and hunger riots throughout Europe, especially in
Ireland, Flanders, and Silesia.4 A radical variant of this argument interprets
the revolutions of 1848 in the broader context of class conflict—a view
championed at the time by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and later refined
by Jürgen Kuczynski.5 However, this materialistic view is by no means
confined to Marxist historiography. Another early proponent was Ernst
Engel, the nineteenth-century Prussian statistician, who maintained that the
economic crisis was what “triggered the bomb” in many parts of Europe.6
This strong emphasis on economic factors is also reflected in one strand of
the Anglo-Saxon literature, ranging from W. W. Rostow, Eric Hobsbawm,
and George Rudé to Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly.7 It is supported by
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Revolutions, pp. 32–35; Price, Revolutions, pp. 17–22; and Sperber, European Revolutions,
pp. 105–07.
8 See for example R. Tilly, “Popular Disorders,” pp. 11–20; Bergmann, “Ökonomische Vorausset-
zungen” and Wirtschaftskrise; and Gailus, Straße.
9 Labrousse, “1848.”
a number of empirical studies of social disorder in the 1840s, which stress
the importance of economic motives.8 For France, Ernest Labrousse explic-
itly linked the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848 to changes in agricultural
output and prices.9
We propose that it is precisely these economic crises that are most helpful
in explaining the simultaneity and regional distribution of the European
turmoil of 1848. In other words, even though ideas and institutions undoubt-
edly shaped the events in question, it was economic misery and the fear
thereof that triggered them. This resurrection of the economic view of the
1848 revolutions is based on the high correlation between the geographic
distribution of economic distress and political turbulence across Europe. In
fact, after identifying the countries that suffered a significant food-supply
shock in 1845–1847, and discussing evidence of a propagation mechanism
that prolonged the crisis well into 1848, we find that there is an almost
perfect geographical match between economic crises and revolutionary
activities. We also show that institutions, namely the existence or absence
of a repressive political regime, while largely irrelevant to the occurrence
of revolutionary activity, had a significant influence on the form such activ-
ity took: revolutions tended to be more violent if the regime was repressive.
The article proceeds as follows. We first investigate the size and signifi-
cance of the grain-price shock that hit most European countries in the sec-
ond half of the 1840s. To grasp the extent to which these shocks were in-
deed unexpected, we estimate the forecast errors of standard adaptive-expec-
tations models for a data set encompassing grain prices for 27 countries
between 1820 and 1850. It turns out that most European countries experi-
enced a severe price shock in 1846 or 1847. We then explore the propaga-
tion mechanism that extended the crisis well into 1848, finding evidence that
falling consumption and investment demand transformed the agricultural
supply shock into a lagged demand shock to the manufacturing sector. We
complete our argument by drawing a connection between political activity
and its possible economic causes.
The economic view of the 1848 revolutions relies heavily on the occur-
rence of an antecedent crisis across Europe. But what defines an economic
crisis? What sort of crisis will trigger political activism? And who will be
the activists?
A possible starting point is the concept of revolution. Among the many
definitions available, two characteristics stand out with respect to the revolu-
tions of 1848: (i) the use of violence, or the credible threat thereof, in an
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10 Kimmel, Revolution, pp. 4–7; and Goldstone, Revolution, pp. 7–12. We follow the broader
definitions of Kimmel, which do not require that a revolution be successful. This broad definition is
similar to the notion of revolution in C. Tilly (“Revolutions,” pp. 519–24) and what he defined later
as a “revolutionary situation” (European Revolutions, p. 10).
11 Labrousse, “1848,” p. 77. Quote from Stearns, Revolutions, p. 12.
12 Siegenthaler, Regelvertrauen, pp. 157–64.
13 In England, 81 percent in 1790 and 78 percent in 1904–1913 (Phelps Brown and Hopkins, “Seven
Centuries,” p. 297); 63 percent in all households in Milan in 1847 (Maddalena, Prezzi, p. 330); 73
percent in Berlin in 1800 (Abel, Agrarkrisen, p. 245); and 59 percent among Prussian rural workers
in 1847, 67 percent among urban workers in 1837 and 1847 (Saalfeld, “Lebensverhältnisse,”
pp. 236–39). Rural workers, of course, produced more of their own food than did urban workers.
effort to change the political system; and (ii) collective action, that is, active
involvement of “the crowd” in that effort.10 Accordingly, in what follows we
will define a revolution either as widespread collective violence targeted at
changing the political system, or as immediate and substantial constitutional
reform implemented to prevent it. The potential or actual involvement of a
large number of individuals has important consequences for our question
here. Obviously, our understanding of why a revolution did or did not take
place should not be based solely on an analysis of elites and their economic
situation. While lawyers, publishers, journalists, doctors, and academics
were undoubtedly important protagonists during the 1848 upheavals, they
would not have been able to effect revolution on their own. It was the lower
classes who provided the “muscle.” Thus our focus must shift from the well-
known revolutionary protagonists to average men and women, especially in
the capitals, where revolutionary activities were most pronounced.11
Economic distress is transformed into revolutionary action through the
mediation of severe popular fear of a deteriorating socioeconomic situation.
Hansjörg Siegenthaler has explained why and how economic discontent can
reach a threshold that triggers political action.12 Under the conditions of the
post-Napoleonic Restoration, this could only take the form of revolutionary
activity in the sense defined above. The question is how to measure both the
discontent and the threshold.
AGRICULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
Households experience macroeconomic flux through changes in their real
budgets. While this is as true today as it was during the first half of the
nineteenth century, the channels through which an economic crisis would
influence the family budget were different then. On the expenditure side,
lower-class households around 1850 still spent between two-thirds and
three-quarters of their incomes on nourishment.13 The bulk of the food pur-
chased consisted of grain products and potatoes, which rendered household
budgets very sensitive to changes in the prices of these goods. This sensitiv-
ity was greater the smaller the overall size of the budget, as low-income
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14 According to Drame et al. (Siècle, p. 20), the price elasticity of demand for wheat hovered around
0.6 throughout nineteenth-century France.
15 See Bass, Hungerkrisen, p. 62. Similar results for Cologne 1818–1850 are reported by Ebeling and
Irsigler (“Zur Entwicklung,” p. 306).
16 For Germany see Gömmel, Realeinkommen, p. 27; and Gerhard, Löhne. For Belgium, France, and














THE INTEGRATION OF PRUSSIAN GRAIN MARKETS, 1820–1850
Notes: Plotted are the annual first differences of the original price series, in logs. For illustrative
purposes, we omit one outlier. The full (abbreviated) sample produces a highly significant coefficient
of correlation of 0.77 (0.73). Due to seasonality in rye and wheat prices, the coefficient for the raw data
is much larger: 0.93 (full sample).
Source: Kopsidis, Marktintegration, table Vg/1 ff.
households tend to allocate more of their budgets to food (Engel’s Law).14
In addition, the ability of households to protect their livelihood by substi-
tuting among foodstuffs was limited. For the period 1816–1850, the litera-
ture on Prussia reports correlation coefficients of 0.87 for wheat and rye
prices, and 0.67 for wheat and potato prices.15 The tight integration of local
grain markets in this period is illustrated by Figure 1, which plots bi-
monthly percentage changes in wheat prices over the previous year against
a similar series for rye prices between 1820 and 1850 for the Prussian
district of Arnsberg.
In principle, data on grain prices should allow us to obtain an idea of the
time path of household expenditures prior to 1848. Getting a grip on the
revenue side of household budgets is somewhat more difficult. On the one
hand, it is well known that nominal industrial wages were fairly stable in the
first half of the century.16 To the extent that this is a valid stylized fact, the
easily accessible data on grain prices would also provide us with data on real
wages, and thus on the purchasing power of fully employed wage laborers.
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17 This point has been discussed by Hobsbawm, “Machine Breakers,” p. 4.
18 For a similar approach to the analysis of prerevolutionary France, see Weir, “Crises économiques,”
p. 938. 
19 See Braudel and Spooner, “Prices,” p. 394. Abel (Agrarkrisen, pp. 290–95) used grams of silver
per kilogram of wheat. In the first half of the nineteenth century, nearly all European currencies were
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Sweden
FIGURE 2
EUROPEAN WHEAT PRICES, 1820–1850
Notes: The series are for London, the region around Paris, Berlin, and Stockholm county. 
Sources: See the Appendix.
On the other hand, there is hardly any reliable information on effective work-
ing hours, which makes it almost impossible to compute a meaningful income
series.17 A feasible solution, for nonagricultural employment at least, is to turn
to Okun’s Law to infer employment from the overall level of industrial activ-
ity.18 We have good reason to believe that this “law” was also valid for the
nineteenth century (in fact, more so than today), and data on industrial produc-
tion, at least at the sectoral level, are available for a number of countries.
Summing up, it seems possible to put together a sufficiently accurate
picture of the economic well-being of households prior to the political tur-
moil that shook Europe around 1848. To that end we have assembled 27
grain-price series (see Appendix for details); four of them are presented in
Figure 2. All series are for wheat prices, with the exception of Oldenburg
and Russia (rye), and have been transformed into grams of fine silver per
hectoliter, the classic unit in price history.19 Whenever possible, we have
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20 For Austria, France, Prussia, and Sweden, where both national and capital series are available, the
coefficient of correlation between both series is on average higher than 0.90 and never smaller than 0.80.
Some regional series show a somewhat larger standard deviation than do the national averages. Our results
do not depend on the choice of the aggregation level, however. See the Appendix for details on the data.
21 For the impact of the Corn Laws on British wheat prices and European wheat-price convergence,



























THE CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEANa AND PRUSSIANb WHEAT PRICES, 1823–1850
a Five groups of Continental countries: Southeast (Switzerland, Lombardy, Papal States, Austria,
Hungary), West (France, Belgium), Center (Germany [aggregated], Netherlands), and North (Finland,
Norway, Sweden). b Eight provinces.
Sources: See the Appendix; for Germany (aggregated) see Jacobs and Richter, Großhandelspreise, p. 74.
tried to gather data for the country’s capital, the likely center of political
activity. These differ only slightly from the national averages, however.20
Figure 2 reveals both similarities and variations across Europe. Whereas
the price patterns in France and Prussia look very similar, the English and
especially the Swedish experience look different. The English series shows
the impact of the easing of the Corn Laws in 1842; and their final repeal in
1846 may help to explain the relative modesty of the increase in that year.
Notwithstanding these and other idiosyncrasies, however, the series for
France, Prussia, and England appear to share a number of regularities. One
of them is a price spike—and thus, presumably, a blow to living standards
for the majority of the population—during the period 1845–1847. This
should not come as a surprise. There is evidence of a convergence of Euro-
pean grain markets by this time, due to cheaper land and sea transport.21
Figure 3 illustrates the phenomenon by comparing the coefficient of varia-
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22 Fremdling and Hohorst, “Marktintegration,” pp. 100f.
tion among different regions of Prussia with the coefficient of variation
among five areas of continental Europe. Despite its large territory and differ-
ent climatic zones, Prussia can be regarded as a fairly well integrated eco-
nomic area in this period.22 Compared with this benchmark, the prolonged
period of pan-European convergence is quite remarkable: starting at levels
four times higher, by the 1840s the regions had reached roughly comparable
levels of market integration.
But there are also discrepancies in the time paths portrayed in Figure 2.
While in France and Prussia the years 1845–1847 are marked by a dramatic
increase in grain prices, the price movements in England and Sweden in
these years do not stand out as particularly irregular. This discrepancy may
be important. Consider a household that, based on past experience, takes the
precautions necessary to insure itself against “regular”—and thus in princi-
ple foreseeable—fluctuations in the cost of living. Clearly, as long as a price
increase stays within the expected range, we would not expect an extraordi-
nary political reaction. If, however, an exceptional price “shock” severely
and unexpectedly diminished the real budget of a large part of the popula-
tion, such a backlash seems much more likely.
The argument lends itself to a more formal exposition. We can picture
households at any given time t as forming expectations about the cost of












where pe and p are expected and actual food prices and the lag length n is
assumed to be constant. The time-dependent parameters  are OLSδα ˆandˆ
coefficients from an autoregressive (AR) model estimated with the present








where ε is a random variable following standard assumptions. That is,
households update their estimates for   in every period t to pro-δα ˆandˆ
duce the best available forecast about , the following period’s priceetp 1+
level. But the forecast will not be perfect. We can then define a price
“shock”—a highly unanticipated and irregular price movement in the sense
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23 See for example Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 216f.
24 Price cycles were well known to contemporaries. They are also quite obvious in the present data.
For evidence on cycles in grain prices see for instance Bauernfeind and Woitek, “Agrarian Cycles.”
25 Based on standard ADF tests. The price series for Baden, Hesse, Saxony, Sweden, and Wurttem-
berg are only stationary around a trend. However, recalculating the AR models with difference-filtered
data or introducing a trend into the estimated model does not change the results. The same is true for
the Finnish series. Only Hesse remains a borderline case. The complete data set (grain prices as well
as computed forecast errors) for the sample is available on request.
where  is a scaling factor that increases in the sample length t and the






with Pt being the (t x n) matrix of observations used to forecast p in all
previous periods (n + 1, . . , t), et+1 is just the standard recursive residual
from Equation 2.23 As
(5)],0[~ 21 εσNet+
a significant deviation of the scaled forecast error from zero indicates both
a “shock” in the sense defined above and a structural break in the model.
Computing the scaled forecast errors et+1 for our set of 27 countries is a
straightforward exercise once the lag length n is determined. We set n = 5
for each country, which allows the AR process—and, thus, the predic-
tors—to cover both cyclical and acyclical regularities in the time series.24
The majority of the series run from 1820 to 1850; with the exception of
Finland, all are stationary.25 Figure 4 presents, for the four countries already
selected for Figure 2, computed forecast errors and the respective two-
standard-error bands. The interpretation of this figure is fairly easy. If at any
point in time the chart line deviates positively (negatively) from zero, the
actual price level at this point exceeded (fell short of) the estimated expecta-
tions of households. If a deviation is greater than twice the standard error of
the model used to compute the forecast—that is, if it breaches one of the
dotted boundaries—we regard the shock as significant.
Before we move on, a brief discussion of the threshold dividing “normal
flux” and “shocks” is called for. Our two-standard-error criterion is purely
statistical, building on the conventional notion of statistical significance. From
a strictly historical perspective this might seem somewhat arbitrary. However,
the statistical criterion does not seem unreasonable; indeed, it very closely
approximates other plausible threshold criteria. For instance, simply focusing
on the number of pre-revolutionary years in which grain prices were above
their average value leads to a very similar profile of shocks across countries.
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26 Such a rule does, however, ignore the role that price expectations might have played in the accu-
mulation of buffer stocks and, ultimately, in the impact of the agrarian crisis on households.
27 Ireland (for which we do not have comparable data) was a very different case. For a comparable
approach see Solar, “Great Famine,” pp. 114–18. 
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FIGURE 4
FORECAST GRAIN-PRICE ERRORS, 1826–1850
Sources: See the Appendix.
Note also that the two-standard-error criterion of the forecast model leads to
very robust results: any other threshold value in an interval of ± 0.18 around
2 produces the very same distribution of pre-1848 shocks among the countries
in our sample (see Table 3, column 3).26 We will return to this issue.
In the event, using the two-standard-error criterion yields results that are
very much in line with those displayed in Figure 2. While the panels for both
France and Prussia feature a significant positive price shock in 1846/47 (as
well as a corresponding negative shock as prices returned to normal in
1848), those for England and Sweden do not. The reason for this is that even
though the latter countries experienced higher prices prior to 1848, these
increases stayed within the confines of the normal ups and downs of the cost
of living. This is obvious in the case of Sweden, but it is also true for Eng-
land, where only the fall in prices after the good harvest of 1847 qualifies as
a shock relative to expectations—albeit a positive one.27
From Figure 4—and from similar figures for the other 23 countries in our
sample28—it follows that a number of European countries did indeed suffer
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29 Boot, Commercial Crisis, p. 66.
30 The dominant agrarian cycle has a length of eight years. See Bauernfeind and Woitek, “Agrarian
Cycles.”
31 Stearns, Revolutions, p. 34; see also Tocqueville, Ancien régime, p. 219.
32 See for example Roscher, Über Kornhandel, pp. 61–65.
a significant cost-of-living shock just prior to 1848. It is tempting to jump
ahead and compare the regional distribution of these findings with the occur-
rence of political turbulence. But there is a problem of timing. Despite some
variance in the onset of the various grain-price shocks, in virtually every
case the year 1848 itself was characterized by sizable price decreases, not
increases. To some extent this might be an artifact of the frequency of the
data. To see whether this is the case, Figure 5 shows monthly wheat prices
for the region around Paris and for Berlin. In both cases, wheat prices were
at a low level at the beginning of 1845. The price increase which followed
accelerated in mid-1845, paused briefly around the turn of 1846, and then
resumed with a vengeance into the summer of 1847, when a third consecu-
tive bad harvest was expected all over Europe.29 Thus, what consumers
experienced in both countries was far more than a “blip”: it was a seemingly
incessant price increase over two-and-a-half years. Moreover, although
prices fell after mid-1847, through the end of that year they remained above
the average for 1838–1845.30 Still, by the time political unrest started to
spread across Europe in early 1848, the cost of living had definitely moder-
ated in both regions. Even in Berlin, where prices were on the rise again
later in the year, the surprisingly good harvests of 1847 helped household
expenditures to regain their average levels during the first half of 1848.
To some extent, the time lag between the peak of the food-price increase
(and the subsistence crisis it caused) and the political unrest is not totally
unexpected. The reason is that people who face starvation are physically
weak and focused on survival. It is only after they have regained their physi-
cal forces and digested their recent trauma that they start to (re)act politi-
cally.31 From this perspective, the time lag is unsurprising. But there is an
additional economic link between the two events.
PROPAGATION OF THE CRISIS TO THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1847–1848
In fact, one of the reasons why so many contemporary observers insisted
on a close connection between the agricultural crisis and the revolutions was
the former’s lagged propagation into other sectors of the economy.32 In this
age, all the world’s economies were still greatly influenced by fluctuations
in agriculture. With a majority of households earning close to the subsis-
tence level, costlier foodstuffs translated into lower demand for all
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FIGURE 5
MONTHLY WHEAT PRICES IN PARIS AND BERLIN, 1840–1848
Notes: The dotted lines mark the average wheat price 1838–1845.
Sources: Amtsblatt 1840–1849; Labrousse, Romano, and Dreyfus, Prix, p. 196f.
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33 For France see Labrousse (“Panoramas”), who relies on monthly data, and the simulations of Lévy-
Leboyer and Bourguignon (French Economy, pp. 227–31), which show a time lag of one year. For the
Prussian textile industry see Blumberg (Deutsche Textilindustrie, pp. 200–05, 382), who uses quarterly
data. For the general crisis of crafts in 1847–1848 see Kuczynski, Lage, pp. 1.178f., 2.85–97; and
Bergmann, Wirtschaftskrise, pp. 50, 63–70.
34 See for instance Obermann, “Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Aspekte,” for evidence on dissaving
in Prussian lower- and middle-class households.
35 Described in detail by Boot, Commercial Crisis, ch. 6. See also Ward-Perkins, “Commercial
Crisis.”
36 For monthly London market and bank rates see Ward-Perkins, “Commercial Crisis,” p. 94. For
annual series of short-term European interest rates see Homer, History, pp. 208, 230, 242, 252, 265,
and 270.
37 For England see Boot, Commercial Crisis, p. 49; for Prussia see Obermann, “Wirtschafts- und
sozialpolitische Aspekte,” p. 163, and Lichter, Preußische Notenbankpolitik, p. 22. In England, the
commercial crisis was immediately overcome when the Bank of England was allowed to lend at a bank
rate above 8 percent. See Ward-Perkins, “Commercial Crisis,” p. 78; and Boot, Commercial Crisis,
p. 52.
other goods, notably manufactures.33 The translation would not have been
immediate, as some households ran down their savings in an attempt to
smooth consumption. However, it seems plausible to presume that lower
household demand (the consumption channel) and, consequently, reduced
investment demand (the investment channel) would eventually turn an agri-
cultural crisis into an industrial crisis as well.
Let us first discuss how the food crisis influenced business attitudes and
investment behavior. During a negative food-supply shock, purchasing
power is shifted from (net) food consumers to (net) food producers. As
nutritional status declines toward—or even falls below—the subsistence
level, demand becomes price-inelastic. This was the case in 1845–1847,
when net food consumers, especially the urban lower and middle classes,
were forced to reduce their rate of saving and run down their financial
assets.34 While their savings fell, savings by net food producers presum-
ably increased; but since food producers will have spent at least some of
their windfall on purchases of other goods, the overall effect of the price
increase on credit demand must have been positive. Under the rules of the
various specie standards, by contrast, credit supply must have contracted.
England, for instance, experienced a gold drain as grain imports soared and
her trade balance turned negative, thus inducing a contraction of the money
supply.35 A third factor in the tightening of credit was misspeculation. In
mid-1847, as harvest forecasts switched from gloomy to optimistic and
massive corn imports from Russia and the United States were reaching the
markets, prices plummeted and many traders found themselves in desper-
ate need of credit. This further increased interest rates all over Europe.36
In fact, the available data underestimate the strain put on borrowers, be-
cause most interest-rate series are regulated bank rates which were not
always adjusted to market conditions. As a result, borrowers were often
subject to credit rationing.37
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38 We comment on selected econometric results in note 44 below.
39 See for example Labrousse, “Panoramas,” pp. viii–x; Obermann, “Wirtschafts- und sozial-
politische Aspekte,” pp. 162–67; and Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, pp. 648–52.
40 See Labrousse, “1848” and “Panoramas”; and Spree and Bergmann, “Konjunkturelle Entwick-
lung,” pp. 314–21. The growth of the German rail network did not accelerate again before the 1850s.
Ward-Perkins (“Commercial Crisis,” p. 87) and Boot (Commercial Crisis, pp. 20, 81) point out that
continued railway investment stabilized the UK economy by late 1847.
41 For the calculations in Table 1, we use the price data described in the Appendix. Replacing the
price data for capital cities by national averages leads to only very slight deviations. The same is true
for the regression results in Table 2.
While most of the available European interest-rate series show a local
maximum in 1847, the impact of tighter financial conditions on investment
was felt as early as the second half of 1846 and, due to the planning lags
involved in investment demand, well into 1848. Even though empirical analy-
sis supporting this view is seriously hampered by the quality of the interest-
rate data, it seems to be in line with the available anecdotal evidence.38 For
instance, we know that numerous firms failed between mid-1846 and the end
of 1848, especially in the textile sector, and that contemporaries saw lack of
credit as one of the main culprits.39 The visible slowdown in railway-track
investment in France, Germany, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) England
also points in that direction. The profitability of the (mostly private) German
railway companies dropped during the crisis, and eventually investment was
scaled back to meet the financing constraints. By contrast, most French rail-
ways had been nationalized; here it was lack of public funds due to the food
crisis which made the government cancel railway investment programs. In
both countries, this seriously affected the metals and mining sectors from
spring 1847 through the end of 1848.40 In sum, it would seem that the deterio-
ration of financial conditions in the wake of the agrarian crisis of 1845–1847
had a sizable lagged impact on firm failures and investment behavior, which
transmitted the crisis across sectors and into the critical year 1848.
Turning from the investment to the consumption channel, we can apply
a somewhat more direct test for the existence of a propagation mechanism.
Although there are no reliable data on household demand for manufactured
goods, it seems reasonable to rely on grain prices as a proxy for the changes
in household demand. The question to be addressed is whether there is
evidence for a lagged propagation of the grain crisis into manufacturing and
possibly, following Okun’s Law, on to employment. As a first step, we
subject the data at hand to a standard Granger causality test. In a nutshell,
the test asks how much of the growth path of, say, French manufacturing
output can be explained by lagged values of French grain prices, and vice-
versa.41 In both cases the possible determinants are added to an AR model
of the endogenous variable. Causality in the sense of the test should be
interpreted conservatively. For instance, rejection of the null hypothesis of
“no causality” in the case of lagged grain prices influencing production
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TABLE 1
GRANGER TESTS OF CAUSALITY, 1820–1850
Country Direction Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
Austria Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.14
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.70 0.45 0.70 0.89 0.86
England Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.05* 0.10
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.55 0.89 0.12 0.20 0.36
France Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.06 0.01* 0.01* 0.06 0.17
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.28 0.50 0.61 0.89 0.66
Hungary Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.01* 0.00* 0.03* 0.02* 0.15
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13
Netherlands Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.20
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.40 0.74 0.40 0.34 0.37
Prussiaa Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.03* 0.00* 0.01* 0.06 0.03*
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.77 0.43 0.44 0.15 0.23
Sweden Grain Prices  Manufacturing 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.01* 0.02*
Manufacturing  Grain Prices 0.20 0.44 0.61 0.46 0.13
a Textile production only.
Notes: P(F-stat) for Granger tests at different lag lengths. All data are annual; grain prices are in levels,
production data are in growth rates computed as first differences of the raw data in logs. Asterisks
indicate rejection of H0 (“no causality” at conventional levels). Granger causality is commonly
interpreted as meaning that the “causal”series precedes the other series and contains information useful
in predicting it.
Sources: See the Appendix.
would suggest that the former series precedes the latter and helps in forecast-
ing it. Table 1 presents our results. The model is symmetrical: the first row
reports the number of lags for the AR process, as well as the number of
lagged exogenous variables included. The period under consideration is
again 1820–1850.
The main message of Table 1 is that grain prices are indeed Granger-
causal for manufacturing in some countries, but the converse fails to hold for
any single country. The results for Austria and the Netherlands are some-
what weak, but still suggestive. The results for England fall in the same
category, but here we should not be surprised given England’s leading role
in the process of industrialization. In general, the evidence clearly suggests
that changes in grain prices preceded changes in the growth rate of non-
agricultural activity. The results lend credibility to our claim that the eco-
nomic crisis of 1845–1847, initiated by bad harvests, extended into 1848 by
triggering a crisis in the manufacturing sector. Or did it? After all, the exis-
tence of Granger-causality between grain prices and manufacturing does not
necessarily imply that a significant shock (in the sense defined above) to the
former series also caused a significant shock to the latter.
In order to see whether there are significant shocks in the available pro-
duction data following significant shocks in grain prices, we again make use
of the method established above. Figure 6 presents forecast errors (from a
model similar to equation 2) for the data used in Table 1. Again, we set the


































































Notes: All growth rates in percent. Prussia: textile production only. Netherlands: model includes trend.
Sources: See the Appendix.
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42 All series are stationary according to standard ADF tests. In the case of the Netherlands the series
is stationary around a trend. The results are robust with regard to changes in the lag length of the AR
model used to compute the forecasts and standard errors.
43 Again the statistical rule identifying “shocks” is quite robust. Table 3 reveals that lower thresholds
for the forecast errors work equally well. See also note 51. Figures for all countries are available on
request.
44 We use m = 4 to economize on degrees of freedom. We have also experimented with one-period
lagged nominal and real interest rates as explanatory variables for England, France, and Prussia. Where
significant, interest rates had a negative impact on output growth. The results with regard to grain prices
and the revolution dummy were similar to the results presented in Table 2. Additional results are
available on request.
lag of the AR part uniformly to n = 5 across all countries, even though some
of the data series are rather short: the French, Prussian, and Habsburg series
start only in 1820, 1828, and 1830, respectively. The remaining series, how-
ever, run from 1815 to 1850.42
Austria, France, Hungary, and Prussia show significant negative
shocks to manufacturing in 1848, whereas England and Sweden, which
were also spared a shock in grain prices, do not. The anomaly is the
Netherlands, which experienced a grain-price shock but no manufactur-
ing shock. Otherwise we find that all countries included in the manufac-
turing data set that were hit by (spared) a significant grain-price shock in
1846/47 also found themselves suffering (exempt) from a significant
industrial recession in 1848.43
Even though Figure 6 adds considerably to the evidence produced by the
Granger tests, there are still reasons why the propagation argument might
not yet be convincing. First, the manufacturing data could themselves be
influenced by the revolutionary activity of 1848. After all, workers protest-
ing in the streets are not at their workbenches. Second, statistical signifi-
cance does not guarantee that the strength of the connection between the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors was sufficient to explain the down-
turn in production. Describing the correlation between the variables using
a simple multivariate regression model addresses both problems. Our exer-
cise includes England, France, Prussia, the Habsburg countries, the Nether-









Equation 6 basically describes an AR model with an added structural
component, where is the growth rate in manufacturing (in percent), p isyˆ
the price of grain (in grams of fine silver per hectoliter), and 1848 is a
dummy variable that equals one in the year 1848 and zero otherwise.44 The
discussion of Granger causality suggests that grain prices enter with a lag.




DETERMINANTS OF MANUFACTURING GROWTH RATES
(see equation 6)
Austria England France Hungary Netherlands Prussiaa Sweden
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
α 21.19*** 13.99* 13.54** 15.42** 9.58 5.54 4.20*** 0.66 7.74 8.81 31.78*** 23.18** 10.87*** 11.05***
(6.33) (2.25) (2.31) (2.65) (1.52) (0.83) (3.79) (0.24) (1.07) (1.10) (3.91) (2.49) (3.70) (3.48)
y
t–1
0.94 0.92 0.61 0.54 0.51 0.45 0.18 0.11 0.39 0.38 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.71
y
t2
0.80 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.48 0.58 0.58 0.14 0.15 0.76 0.64 0.34 0.31
y
t3
0.63 0.53 0.27 0.31 0.18 0.05 0.54 1.26 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.39
y
t4
0.33 0.28 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.19
pt1 0.22*** 0.11 0.07 0.09** 0.16*** 0.08* 0.09*** 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.42*** 0.29** 0.14*** 0.15***
(4.81) (1.10) (1.65) (2.18) (3.59) (1.80) (3.37) (1.11) (0.95) (0.92) (4.11) (2.49) (3.07) (2.86)
1848t 9.82 10.49*** 12.38*** 6.55* 4.01 13.08** 2.22
(1.63) (3.17) (3.71) (1.88) (0.58) (2.77) (1.29)
Period 1835–50 1835–50 1820–50 1820–50 1825–50 1825–50 1835–50 1835–50 1820–50 1820–50 1833–50 1833–50 1820–50 1820–50
R2(adj.) 0.64 0.66 0.28 0.36 0.39 0.64 0.46 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.57 0.59 0.49 0.48
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
a Textile production only.
Notes: HAC t-statistics (absolute) are in parentheses. In all cases the AR(m = 4) elements of the models are jointly significant at conventional levels (Wald F-test). Q-tests
(at lag 1 and larger) suggest no autocorrelation of the residuals. The models for England, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden include a linear and a quadratic trend term
(not reported).
Sources: See the Appendix.
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45 Note that to the extent that the revolution is in fact endogenous to the economic crisis, we should
rely on a model excluding the 1848 dummy.
of 1848 might have been a consequence of the revolution, not of the agricul-
tural supply shock. Table 2 presents OLS estimates of equation 6.
Let us first consider columns (i), which exclude the time dummy. From
what has been said about the channels linking agriculture with manufactur-
ing, we should expect the grain-price coefficients to be negative and signifi-
cant. And indeed, the sign of the impact of grain prices is as anticipated in
all cases, and lacks statistical significance at conventional levels only in the
cases of England (the industrial leader) and the Netherlands.
Considering that some of the time series are rather short, the performance
of the consumption channel is quite robust with regard to the introduction
of the 1848 dummy variable (columns (ii)). The dummy has at least a mar-
ginally significant negative impact for France, Hungary, and Prussia, while
the impact in England (which did not have a revolution) is significantly
positive. In the cases of Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the dummy
remains insignificant. But while the revolutions played some role in shaping
manufacturing activity, an important part of the explanation of the slump in
production in 1848 obviously still derives from lagged grain prices. The
negative sign on pt–1 remains unchanged across countries and, with the ex-
ception of Austria and Hungary, at least marginally significant. In the case
of England the grain-price variable actually gains in significance after the
introduction of 1848. The results for the Dutch data remain unchanged.45
What was the quantitative impact of the 1847 grain crisis on manufactur-
ing? Take for instance Prussia and France, which display a significant coef-
ficient on pt–1 in both columns. Grain prices in Prussia (France) increased by
27.12 (37.85) grams of fine silver from 1846 to 1847. Based on the esti-
mated coefficients in Table 2, Columns (ii), this translated into a decrease
in 1848 manufacturing output of 7.86 (3.03) percentage points or 32.67
(23.03) percent of the actual decline. According to Columns (i), the decline
explained by the grain crisis is even larger (47.31 and 46.06 percent, respec-
tively). In England, the negative impact of the agricultural price increase on
industrial expansion remained in the two-percentage-point range—too low,
that is, to force an overall decline in real activity. We can conclude that the
quantitative impact of the grain crisis on the industrial sector was consider-
able in France, Prussia, and the Habsburg countries, but not in more highly
industrialized England.
CRISIS AND REVOLUTION
So far we have established the existence of a regional pattern of signifi-
cant shocks to grain prices—and, thus, to the cost of living in a number of
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46 A possibly critical case could be the Netherlands, which Stearns (Revolutions, p. 1) would not
include in the second group.
47 See Ó Gráda, Ireland, and for data sources Solar, “Great Famine,” pp. 114f., 120. Note, however,
that the absence of data seems equally spread across the different categories. For instance, we also lack
grain-price data for Romania and Sicily, which experienced severe political turmoil. For the different
states see Stearns, Revolutions; Price, Revolutions; Kaelble, “1848,” p. 262f.; and Goldstone, Revolu-
tion, p. 285. The two Italian countries in our sample, Lombardy and the Papal States, both experienced
strong revolutionary turmoil (see Sperber, European Revolutions, pp. 109f., 222).
48 See Valentin, Geschichte, vol. 1, for the 1848 revolutions in the German states.
49 For these countries we were unable to find compatible grain price data extending back to the
1820s.
European countries—between 1845 and 1847; we then linked the grain
crisis to the manufacturing sector, which helps explain the propagation of
the initial shock into 1848. But we still have to connect our economic find-
ings with the political data.
It is not altogether straightforward to determine whether a given country
experienced a revolution or not. For the non-German countries we follow
the consensus in the literature, according to which France, the Italian states,
Switzerland, Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary experienced widespread politi-
cal violence and thus, clearly, revolutions in any sense of the word. In the
broader sense defined above, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands,
which were able to avoid widespread violence only by undertaking preemp-
tive constitutional reform, also qualify as revolutionary situations.46 By
contrast, the other Scandinavian states, England, Russia, and Spain neither
experienced widespread political violence, nor saw their governments forced
to change the constitution significantly. For Ireland, which experienced
severe agrarian crime but arguably no revolutionary action, we could not
find reliable grain-price data for our sample period.47
For the German states, evaluation is much more difficult. The German
historiography of 1848 has long been determined by the Prussia-centered
perspective of German unification. But in the 1840s the German states were
fully independent entities with quite different political paths, some with
constitutions (as in southern Germany), others absolutist and more or less
repressive (such as Prussia). Unlike Europe as a whole, the German states
in our sample can be classed into only two groups. Widespread violence
occurred in Baden, Bavaria, Hamburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, Prussia, Saxony, and Württemberg; preemptive constitutional
concessions occurred in Bremen, Brunswick, and Oldenburg. Not one of
them failed to experience either political violence or preemptive reform.48
Our findings are summarized in Table 3, which covers nearly the whole
of Europe with the exceptions of Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, a few Italian and
some smaller German states, and the European territories of the Ottoman
Empire.49 The data in the first five columns refer to grain prices. Column 1




















































Austria 52.89 103.96 (47) 3  2.72 (47) yes –8.04 –2.49 yes yes yes
Baden 76.96 136.57 (47) 3  2.31 (46) yes no yes
Bavaria 70.02 127.28 (47) 3  2.74 (47) yes yes yes
Bohemia 61.48 101.23 (47) 2  2.41 (46) yes yes yes
France 93.82 149.18 (47) 2 2.71 (47) yes –10.64 –2.63 yes no yes
Hamburg 67.11 108.72 (47) 2  2.45 (46) yes no yes
Hesse-Darmstadt 76.68 119.69 (47) 3  2.24 (45) yes no yes
Hungary 39.01   92.34 (47) 3  2.38 (47) yes –4.93 –2.02 yes yes yes
Lombardy 88.32 119.13 (47) 2  2.19 (47) yes yes yes
Mecklenburg-Schw. 72.91 110.89 (47) 2  2.27 (46) yes yes yes
Papal States 73.99 105.12 (47) 2  2.56 (47) yes no yes
Prussia 71.20 110.68 (47) 2  2.41 (47) yes –24.02 –2.48 yes yes yes
Saxony 73.30 125.21 (47) 2  2.23 (47) yes yes yes
Switzerland 87.88 146.72 (47) 2  2.76 (47) yes no yes
Württemberg 75.90 128.70 (47) 3  2.57 (46) yes no yes
Belgium 93.80 140.13 (47) 2  2.54 (47) yes no (yes)
Bremen 76.12 109.51 (47) 2  2.59 (47) yes no (yes)
Brunswick 62.33 100.29 (47) 2  2.23 (47) yes no (yes)
Denmark 66.32   81.51 (47) 2  1.16 (46) no no (yes)
Netherlands 82.58 135.99 (47) 2  2.33 (47) yes –4.06 0.57 no no (yes)
Oldenburgc 52.13   79.34 (47) 3  2.51 (45) yes no (yes)
314
Berger and Spoerer
















































England 115.31 134.68 (47) 1  1.81 (47) no 3.94 1.09 no no no
Finland 73.57   73.69 (45) 1 –0.34 (46) no yes no
Norway 89.28 119.74 (47) 2  2.13 (47) yes no no
Russiac 50.72   44.12 (48) 0 –0.10 (46) no yes no
Spain 105.34 141.27 (47) 2  1.75 (47) no yes no
Sweden 75.76   81.44 (45) 1  1.25 (45) no 1.69 1.08 no no no
a Grams of fine silver per hectoliter.
b Number of years in which grain prices exceeded the average for 1838–45 (Column 1).
c Rye prices.
Sources: See the Appendix.
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50 These results are in line with those of Goldstone (Revolution, pp. 343–48), who finds a high
geographical correlation between population pressure and state crises in Europe between 1750 and
maximum price between 1845 and 1848. Column 3 reports the number of
years between 1845 and 1847 in which prices reached heights exceeding the
average of 1838–1845. In column 4 the maximum price-forecast error of the
years 1845 to 1848 is divided by the corresponding standard error. Whether
the deviation of the actual from the forecasted price between 1845 and 1848
was a “shock” in the sense defined above (deviation greater than two stan-
dard errors), is indicated in column 5. Columns 6–8 repeat the shock analy-
sis for those countries for which we have industrial production data. If the
deviation between actual and forecasted industrial growth is greater than two
standard errors, we note a production shock in column 8.
The next step is to confront these results with the political data in the last
two columns. Column 9 indicates whether or not the political atmosphere on
the eve of 1848 was repressive, and column 10 indicates whether or not a
country experienced a revolution in that year. For countries with immediate
and substantial constitutional changes but no widespread violence, the “yes”
is in parentheses.
Now we are able to give an answer to the question of whether the Euro-
pean revolutions of 1848 were caused, or at least strongly influenced, by
short-term economic factors. Comparing columns 8 and 10 we find that,
with the exception of the Netherlands, those countries known to have expe-
rienced an industrial shock underwent a revolution as well. By contrast, in
England and Sweden there was neither an industrial production shock nor
a revolution. It is also reassuring that, very much in line with the analysis in
the preceding section, the shocks in food prices and manufacturing are
highly correlated. Evidence for just seven countries may not be totally per-
suasive, however. Therefore let us compare columns 5 and 8, which register
the occurrence of shocks in grain prices and manufacturing. Again with the
exception of the Netherlands, we find that only countries showing a price
shock in 1845–1848 experienced a manufacturing shock in 1848, and vice-
versa. This finding adds further weight to our hypothesis that a propagation
mechanism extended the shock waves of the agrarian crisis into 1848. On
the basis of this hypothesis we can compare the earlier price shocks in col-
umn 5 directly with the political data for 1848 in column 10 even for those
countries for which we do not have production data. The result is surpris-
ingly clear-cut. There is a near-perfect regional match between grain-price
shocks and revolutions: among the 21 states experiencing revolutionary
turmoil, 20 had been hit by a grain-price shock between 1845 and 1847.
Only Denmark is an outlier. Conversely, of the six countries without a revo-
lution only one, Norway, showed signs of a price shock in the grain
market.50
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1850. Note, however, that our results are immune to the criticism that the explanatory variable (in our
case the price shocks) is endogenous.
51 Similarly, column 7 shows that any threshold between zero and 2.01 will separate countries with
or without shocks in industrial production in a way that is compatible with the economic view (except
for the Netherlands).
52 We have estimated a ML-binary logit model for the occurrence of a revolution, with a constant and
the grain-price forecast error in 1847, for the 27 countries or regions in our sample. The LHS variable
is constructed as a dummy that takes the value 1 when column 10 in Table 3 shows either a “yes” or
a “(yes),” and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficient for the grain-price forecast error is 1.83 with a SE
of 0.57 (significant at the 4 percent level). This translates into an increase in the probability of a revolu-
tion for a one-unit increase in the 1847 forecast error from zero of about 21 percentage points. A one-
unit increase from a forecast-error level of 1 (2) increases the probability of a revolution by about 46
(23) percentage points. The McFadden-R2 is 0.18. The standard deviation of the 1847 forecast errors
is 0.88. Using the grain-price forecast errors listed in Table 3, which for some countries deviates from
the 1847 figure, does not change the qualitative results. Details are available on request.
The outcome is also remarkably robust with regard to the underlying
definition of economic “shocks.” As pointed out earlier, the two-standard-
error threshold is merely a statistical rule of thumb. However, a comparison
of columns 4 and 10 reveals that indeed any threshold value between 1.82
and 2.18 would have yielded the same results, namely that 25 of the 27 cases
support our economic view of the 1848 revolutions.51 The robustness of the
result strongly suggests a positive correlation between the size of the price
shock and the likelihood of a revolution. Indeed, a simple logit model exer-
cise reveals that an increase in the pre-1848 grain-price forecast error signif-
icantly increases the probability of revolutionary activity.52
Note also that less sophisticated measures of the depth of the agrarian
crisis lead to comparable findings. For instance, a comparison of columns
3 and 10 shows that the number of years in the period 1845–1847 in which
a country suffered from relatively high grain prices is also a remarkably
good predictor of revolutionary activity in 1848. Of the politically stable
countries, only Norway and Spain had experienced more than a single year
of high grain prices in the previous three. By contrast, all countries undergo-
ing revolution endured a minimum of two years of above-average prices
before 1848.
Is there anything we can say about the outliers? First, regional factors
may have played a role. It is interesting to note that the countries for which
our hypothesis fails (Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands) all abut the
North Sea, as do all those countries (excepting tiny Brunswick) that expe-
rienced some sort of economic trauma in the mid-1840s, and yet avoided
violent revolution in 1848 (see Figure 7). Second, institutional and politi-
cal factors may have been important. An obvious candidate is poor relief,
which may have bolstered the dispensing regime’s legitimacy. We have,
however, found it very difficult to gather comparable information for our
sample countries. The most comprehensive comparative study is that of
Peter Lindert, who compares ten European countries and finds, significantly
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FIGURE 7
WHEAT PRICES IN EUROPE
Notes: Left: average wheat price, 1820–1845. Middle: maximum wheat price, 1845–1848. Right:
intensity of price shock (if any). All prices are in grams of fine silver per hectolitre. ABC, Abc, abc:
Country with violent revolution, immediate constitutional change, or neither.
Source: Table 3, cols. 2 and 4.
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53 See Lindert, “Poor Relief,” pp. 113–18.
54 Including a dummy variable that takes the value one when column 9 of Table 3 indicates the
presence of a repressive regime in the above-mentioned model explaining the occurrence of revolution
(violent or preemptive) produces no significant effects. The ML-binary logit model for the occurrence
of violent revolution includes a constant, the grain-price forecast error in 1847, and the dummy variable
indicating repression. The LHS variable is constructed as a dummy that takes the value one when
column 10 of Table 3 shows a “yes.” The estimated coefficients for both the grain-price forecast error
(1.43) and the repressive-regime dummy (2.52) are significant at least at the 4 percent level. The
McFadden-R2 is 0.26. Again, we arrive at qualitatively similar results when we use the forecast errors
as presented in Table 3 instead. Details are available on request.
for our purposes, that poor relief per capita in England and the Netherlands
were far higher than in the other countries.53
One institutional factor that can be assessed, though, is whether a regime
was repressive or not. It is interesting that, as column 9 of Table 3 indicates,
the North Sea countries were all governed by nonrepressive, liberal regimes.
To pursue this idea, we employed the logit model for explaining the likeli-
hood of political revolution in general (discussed above), along with a model
explaining violent revolution in particular. We find that whereas an increase
in the grain price forecast error significantly increased the likelihood of both
violent and preemptive revolution, the presence of a repressive political
regime affected only the probability of violence. Violent revolution was
significantly likelier to occur under repressive political regimes.54 Our find-
ings thus support the idea that the character of the regime largely determined
the form of political upheaval in 1848, but that it was the economic crisis
that set the wheels of revolution in motion.
CONCLUSIONS
Many historians investigating the 1848 revolutions in Europe emphasize
the force of ideas as their leading cause. The economic crisis starting with
the bad harvest of 1845 is regarded, at most, as one of numerous enabling
factors. In view of the analysis put forward in the present study, this view
severely underestimates the political dynamics resulting from the extreme
economic fluctuations of 1845–1848. A more pointed statement of this view
would be that it was economic misery, rather than “ideas,” that caused the
outbreak of revolutions in early 1848.
As an initial step, we have here established a propagation mechanism
linking the agricultural crisis of 1845–1847 with the subsequent industrial
crisis of 1846–1848. Using a number of standard time-series tools, it has
been shown that over the period 1820–1850 there was a systematic and
significant relationship between agriculture and industry in France, Prussia,
Austria, Hungary, and Sweden—but not in England, the world’s leading and
most highly industrialized economy, nor in the Netherlands. In particular,
there is evidence that an increase in grain prices—a good proxy for the cost
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55 Thompson, “Moral Economy.”
of living at the time—led after a certain lag to a decline in manufacturing
activity. As such, the dramatic increase in food prices in 1845–1847 must
have had a strong negative effect on production and employment in the
industrial sectors by 1848, the year of political unrest. This result is poten-
tially important. It allows us to draw direct inferences about the occurrence
of revolutionary activity from the rich data on European grain prices.
In a second step, we have demonstrated the regional pattern of the eco-
nomic shocks that hit various European countries prior to 1848. It turns out
that “shocks,” defined as significant forecast errors based on an adaptive
expectations model, help to predict revolutionary activity: if—and only if—a
country was subject to a shock in 1845–1848, it experienced revolution.
Using the much sparser available data on manufacturing we find that France,
Prussia, Austria, and Hungary suffered a shock-like decline in industrial
production in 1848, paralleled by significant revolutionary activity. While
this result is very much in line with the economic view of the 1848 events,
it is based on a rather small number of observations. However, making use
of the link established above between agriculture and manufacturing, we
again turn to grain prices for help. In fact, the regional pattern of grain-price
shocks is very similar to that of industrial crises: if a country was subjected
to a grain-price shock between 1845 and 1847, then it went on to undergo
revolution in 1848. Of 21 countries subject to a grain price shock, 20 fol-
lowed this crude but obviously powerful rule, Norway being the peaceful
exception. Among the six countries that escaped grain-price shocks, only
Denmark experienced far-reaching, and in our sense revolutionary, constitu-
tional reform. These results are very robust with regard to the underlying
definition of an economic shock. We conclude that the occurrence of an
economic shock in the later 1840s was an important factor in triggering the
1848 revolutions across Europe.
While institutions—namely, the presence or absence of a repressive politi-
cal regime—add little to the explanation of revolutionary activity as such,
we find that they did exert a significant influence on the form that this activ-
ity took. The revolutions of 1848 tended to be violent if the regime was
repressive. We conclude that the presence of repressive regimes did not
trigger revolutionary events, but did help to shape them.
Ideology also played a role, but probably only in combination with eco-
nomic crisis. The peasants and artisans of the 1840s, suffering a severe
deterioration in their socioeconomic status, needed some kind of alternative
vision—realistic or otherwise—before they would become revolutionaries.
At the time, these alternatives were offered by peasant leaders who appealed
to traditional conceptions of fairness (E. P. Thompson’s “moral economy”55)
and by politically discontented townsmen who called for liberalism and
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56 The similar food-price increase of 1854–1855 created neither famine nor social unrest; see C. Tilly
et al., Rebellious Century.
57 Hobsbawm has termed this “bargaining by riot” (“Machine Breakers,” p. 57).
democracy. In contrast to the crises of 1816/17, when there was still hope
that the forces of restoration could be defeated, the crisis of 1845–1848 took
place in the context of a much larger and more popular variety of political
alternatives that called for immediate action.56 Here, at least, we see histori-
cal singularities. The likelihood that revolutionary ideology was a necessary
condition for upheaval transcends a narrow economistic approach. But
although the economic crises did not provide the brains, they did supply the
brawn. Revolutionary agitators, pursuing their goals in an undemocratic and
often repressive political environment, needed violence (or the credible
threat of it) as a political instrument, and only the “crowd” could provide
it.57 We conclude that without the economic crisis of 1845–1848, which so
obviously endangered the economic welfare of so many people and discred-
ited the ancien régime so thoroughly, there would not have been the critical
mass to support these new ideas. Hence no explanation of the European
revolutions of 1848 should neglect short-term economic factors.
Appendix: Data Sources
Political data (intensity of repression, intensity of revolution) are taken for Germany and
the Austrian Empire from Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, chs. 7 and 8, and
Valentin, Geschichte, chs. 4, 6, and 7. For the European states, see Stearns, Revolutions,
Price, Revolutions, Sperber, European Revolutions, and the articles in Dowe, Haupt, and
Langewiesche, Europa, ch. 1. Numerous other historical works were consulted which are
not in the list of references. Please contact the authors for a list.
Grain-price data would ideally be an average for the harvest year, weighted by sales
and expressed in, well, euros. The currency problem can quite easily be overcome by
transforming recorded local prices per local unit into grams of fine silver per hectoliter.
For the conversion of currencies, measures of capacity, and measures of weight we used
Klimpert, Lexikon, at times checked by and supplemented with data in other literature
on the subject. As both the levels and the volatility of the data are strongly influenced
by the way the average is calculated, we have ignored the few available series for the
harvest year or ones which relied only on one or two dates per year. This, for example,
is the case for the Lisbon price series of Magalhães Godinho, Prix, pp. 76–78. Very
probably the only series that is partially weighted by sales is the one for France, where
the weighting was (or was supposed to be) done at the very first level of recording (see
Drame et al., Siècle, ch. 4). Whenever possible, we have tried to find data for the coun-
try’s capital, because these were the prices actually observed (and responded to) in the
political center. If not stated otherwise, the data are available annually from 1815 to
1850. The abbreviations in parentheses are the country codes used in Figure 7. Country
codes in capitals stand for violent revolutions; initial capitals mean preemptive revolu-
tion; lower case means no revolution.
Revolutions of 1848 321
1. Austria (AUS; Lower Austria, contains Vienna): Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 484;
mining and industrial production 1830–50 Komlos, Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 294f.
2. Baden (BAD; Mannheim, Heidelberg): “Getreidepreise in Deutschland,” p. I.297.
3. Bavaria (BAV; Munich): Seuffert, Statistik, p. 124. 
4. Belgium (Bel): Seuffert, Statistik, p. 401. 
5. Bohemia (BOH; Prague): Schebek, Collektiv-Ausstellung, pp. 99–101.
6. Bremen (Bre): Gerhard and Kaufhold, Preise, pp. 204f.
7. Brunswick (Bru): Soetbeer, Beiträge, p. 8.
8. Denmark (Den; Copenhagen, 1819–50): Weisz, “Getreidepreise,” p. 397, wheat prices
1819–32 extrapolated by using rye prices from Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 489. The
correlation between the wheat and rye series 1833–50 is 0.72. 
9. England (eng; London): Rostow, British Economy, p. 125, cf. also Weisz, “Getreidepreise,”
p. 350; British industrial production Crafts and Harley, “Output Growth,” p. 727.
10. Finland (fin): Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 492.
11. France (FRA; département Seine-et-Oise, surrounds Paris): Labrousse, Romano, and
Dreyfus, Prix, 196f.; industrial production 1820–50 Lévy-Leboyer and Bouguignon,
French economy, table A-IV.
12. Hamburg (HAM): “Getreidepreise in Deutschland,” p. I.296.
13. Hesse (HES; 1822–50): Mittheilungen der hessischen Zentralstelle, p. 334.
14. Hungary (HUN; Pest, 1819–50): Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 485; mining and indus-
trial production 1830–50 Komlos, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 294f.
15. Lombardy (LOM; Milan): Maddalena, Prezzi, p. 379.
16. Mecklenburg (MEC; Rostock): “Getreidepreise im Grossherzogthum Mecklenburg,”
pp. 26, 28.
17. Netherlands (Net; Utrecht): Posthumus and Ketner, Inquiry, pp. 422f.; industrial pro-
duction Smits, Horlings, and van Zanden, “Measurement,” pp. 62f.
18. Norway (nor; 1820–50): Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 518.
19. Oldenburg (Old; rye prices 1817–50): “Durchschnittspreise,” p. 5. 
20. Papal States (PAP; Rome): Földes, “Getreidepreise,” p. 482.
21. Prussia (PRU; Berlin): 1815 Seuffert, Statistik, p. 386; 1816–60 Engel, “Getreide-
preise,” p. 257; woolen weaving production 1828–50 Blumberg, Deutsche Textil-
industrie, p. 382.
22. Russia (rus; Moscow, rye prices): Mironov, Chlebnie ceny, pp. 235–37. 
23. Saxonia (SAX; Dresden 1820–50): Mittheilungen des statistischen Vereins, pp. 66f.
(1820–31, obvious misprint for 1821 corrected), Seuffert, Statistik, p. 375 (1832–50).
24. Spain (spa; Barcelona): price index (1913=100) from Sardà, Política Monetaria, pp.
303–05, rebased in prices by Consejo Superior Bancario, Dictamen, pp. 39, 109.
Obvious misprint for 1848 corrected.
25. Sweden (swe; Stockholm): Jörberg, History of Prices, pp. 124–27; industrial produc-
tion Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper, table II.
26. Switzerland (swi): Historische Statistik, p. 480.
27. Württemberg (WUR): Mährlen and Trüdinger, “Durchschnittspreise,” II.120f.
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